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Flash

Drift's compensation plan has caused dissatisfaction, with a loss of about 1 dollar for every 100 dollars

The perpetual contract protocol Drift (now Velocity) Foundation has opened claims and redemptions for the security incident on April 1. Affected users can claim newly issued compensation tokens DFX at a rate of 1 DFX for every $1 of verified loss. DFX is a Solana standard SPL asset, with a fixed total supply of approximately 299.5 million tokens, corresponding to about $295.4 million in verified losses, and no further issuance will occur.Users can destroy DFX on the official portal and redeem it for USDT at the redemption price, or trade it on secondary markets like Raydium. The redemption price is determined by the balance of the recovery pool divided by the number of DFX tokens that have not yet been destroyed. Currently, there are about 3.11 million USDT in the pool, with a redemption price of approximately $0.0104, allowing for about $1 back for every $100 lost, covering about 1% of the losses, which has caused dissatisfaction in the community, believing there is a significant gap from the expected full compensation.The plan also includes a maximum support commitment of $127.5 million from Tether, up to $20 million from partners, as well as subsequent sources such as transaction fee sharing from the new trading platform Velocity and the recovery of stolen funds, most of which are upper limits or installment arrangements, and were not included in the pool on the opening day. After the DFX launch, the redemption price remains around $0.0104, while the secondary market trading price has risen from about $0.01 to approximately $0.03, with a 24-hour increase of about 210%, and liquidity at that time was around $200,000. The tokens can be freely transferred, and the trading price does not have to equal the redemption price; buyers are mainly concerned with subsequent funding, protocol revenue, recovered funds, as well as the impact of early redemptions and the destruction of unclaimed portions after the window closes on January 1, 2028.

Slow Fog: DFX Finance Attacked Due to Lack of Reentrancy Protection in Curve Contract Flash Loan Function

ChainCatcher news, according to intelligence from the SlowMist security team, the DFX Finance project on the ETH chain was attacked, resulting in the attacker profiting approximately $231,138. The SlowMist security team shared the following in a brief:The attacker first called the viewDeposit function in a contract named Curve to check the deposit status in the contract, and then constructed the appropriate amount of money to borrow for the flash loan based on the returned deposit status.Next, they continued with the flash function of the Curve contract for the flash loan. Since this function did not have reentrancy lock protection, the attacker utilized the flashCallback function in the flash loan to call the deposit function of the contract for depositing.The deposit function externally called the proportionalDeposit function of the ProportionalLiquidity contract, which transferred the funds borrowed in step two back to the Curve contract, recorded the deposit for the attacking contract, and minted deposit receipts for the attacking contract.By reentering the deposit function to transfer funds back to the Curve contract, the attacker successfully passed the balance check for the flash loan repayment.Finally, they called the withdraw function to make a withdrawal. During the withdrawal, the deposit receipt recorded for the attacking contract in step three was burned, allowing them to successfully withdraw approximately 2,283,092,402 XIDR tokens and 99,866 USDC tokens for profit.The main reason for this attack was that the flash loan function of the Curve contract did not implement reentrancy protection, allowing the attacker to reenter the deposit function to transfer tokens and pass the balance check for the flash loan repayment. Since there was a record during the deposit, the attacker could successfully withdraw and profit. (source link)
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