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Cryptocurrency Primary Investment: The Triangular Game of Humanity, Law, and Capital

Core Viewpoint
Summary: The cost of industry progress should not be repeatedly paid by each new generation of entrants.
IOSG Ventures
2026-11-18 23:27:07
The cost of industry progress should not be repeatedly paid by each new generation of entrants.

Author: IOSG Legal

Having deeply engaged in the cryptocurrency industry for many years, we have invested in hundreds of projects, and our understanding of investment terms has evolved from initial confusion to acceptance, and now to reflection and questioning:

When a project's structure becomes increasingly complex and documents more specialized, are we truly enhancing security, or merely making risks appear more respectable? When governance clauses fill the agreements, can these rights truly be enforced, or are they just empty talk?

The systemic risks in Web3 investments often lie not in the market, but in the lack of accountability in the architecture itself. The documents may look good and the terminology may be complete, but in the worst-case scenario, investors cannot find responsible parties, cannot constrain control, and cannot access remedies. Essentially, this is not risk control, but risk packaging.

Three recurring structural issues:

1. Excessive entity segmentation: Value, control, and responsibility are artificially separated. Research and operations are in one company, while token issuing and treasury are in another entity (foundation/SPV), and investors may only sign with one of them. It appears to be risk isolation, but in reality, it is "risk without ownership": when something goes wrong, everyone can say, "That's not my responsibility." What investors truly fear is not decentralization, but the lack of accountability.

2. Governance is symbolic: There are documents but no mechanisms; there are rights but no teeth. In the early days, investors relied on verbal commitments and gentleman's agreements (which now seem like a cowboy spirit of adventure), leading to later instruments like SAFTE/SAFE/SAFT/SAFE+Token Warrant, yet key elements remain absent: substantive consent rights for major matters, budgeting and auditing rhythms for treasury expenditures, replacement rules for multi-signature signers, and the scope and boundaries of information disclosure. It reads like corporate governance but executes like a wish list.

3. Remedies are structurally weakened: Assets move faster than laws, entities change faster than procedures, and cross-border costs are higher than compensations; these are the reasons why protecting rights in crypto investments is difficult. For investors, true risk control is not about making terms longer, but ensuring that in the worst-case scenario, they can "stem the bleeding," "pursue claims," and "enforce rights."

This industry has moved out of the early "dark forest," but project collapses are still common. The root causes are twofold: one is that some founders lack respect for the spirit of contracts, and the other is that the industry lacks structural memory, with investors repeatedly making the same mistakes in structural design.

This article discusses five real case scenarios, highlighting those structural issues that are often overlooked but can be fatal in extreme situations, distilling lessons from practice into actionable principles.

Case One: From "Perfect Structure" to "Disappearing Defendant"

[Case Keywords: Entity Segmentation, Legal Entity Continuity]

A few years ago, we encountered a project dedicated to building blockchain game infrastructure. The team had an impressive background and top-notch experience, and their "one-click on-chain" solution targeted the core pain points of traditional game manufacturers. To raise funds and avoid complex global regulations, the project team designed a "perfect" offshore structure that was widely recognized at the time: registering a parent company in Delaware, USA, responsible for technology development, while establishing an SPV (special purpose vehicle) in crypto-friendly Gibraltar specifically for issuing tokens. The technology and team were in the U.S., and the tokens were in the offshore SPV, which was the default consensus in the investment circle at that time.

Faced with this structure, investors typically took two paths: traditional equity investors put money into the parent company, reasoning that controlling the team meant controlling the project. We chose a more "Crypto Native" path: directly signing a Token Purchase Agreement with the Gibraltar SPV to exchange investment for future token rights. Our judgment was that since tokens were the core asset of this ecosystem's future, directly obtaining token rights was more straightforward than equity. At the time, this seemed like a rational judgment.

After the investment was completed, there was a relatively calm period. The project progressed slowly but steadily, and the team maintained polite and restrained communication with investors.

However, one day, the Gibraltar SPV suddenly announced a CEO change without notifying the U.S. parent company or any investors, almost simultaneously unilaterally initiating token issuance. Internal struggles became public, market confidence collapsed instantly, and the token price plummeted upon launch. The "token rights" we held overnight transformed from potential value into highly volatile digital chips.

Our first reaction was anger, but after calming down, we quickly assessed that this seemed more like a power struggle within the founding team. The SPV management clearly attempted to shake off the parent company's control, and institutions that invested in the parent company's equity would inevitably take legal action, potentially bringing the project back on track. We chose to wait and see.

Sure enough, the parent company and its equity investors swiftly filed lawsuits in both the U.S. and Gibraltar, achieving initial success: they successfully obtained a temporary restraining order from a U.S. court, restoring the parent company's access to critical technological infrastructure, and also secured a freezing order from the Gibraltar court, freezing most of the tokens issued by the SPV. The parent company was likely to regain control.

Then, an unexpected reversal occurred that no one anticipated.

The Gibraltar court overturned the freezing order. The reason was chillingly simple: the U.S. parent company had failed to submit a required compliance document for over a year and had been administratively dissolved by the Delaware government over a year ago.

Legally, this company no longer existed.

A company that is "dead" in legal terms cannot qualify as a plaintiff to sue anyone. It has no legal personality, no qualification as a responsible party, and no interests that can be protected by the court.

Those institutions that invested in the parent company's equity were completely out of the game overnight. Their legal entity had vanished, and all claims to rights lost their foundation. Investment, reduced to zero.

We, who invested in the SPV token rights, although our assets significantly shrank due to internal strife, at least still held tradable tokens. Meanwhile, those who were considered "safer" equity investors completely lost their legal standing.

Rather than feeling fortunate, the moment was filled with dread. The deadliest risk in this industry may not be market crashes, technical vulnerabilities, or even the character of the founders, but a forgotten compliance document that costs only a few hundred dollars.

Case Conclusion

  • The continuity of legal due diligence (Legal DD) is crucial. The key to investment decisions lies not only in confirming that the company is in "Good Standing" at the moment of signing the agreement but also in establishing a continuous compliance monitoring mechanism throughout the investment cycle. Ensuring that every legal entity in the investment chain is "alive" and compliant is the most basic bottom line of investment management, yet it is often overlooked.

  • One must penetrate and understand the actual control of offshore structures. When core assets (such as token issuance rights) are placed in an offshore SPV, and the parent company's control over the SPV relies solely on a piece of paper, investors must remain highly vigilant. Strong covenants must be included in the investment agreement, such as: the SPV's directors or controllers cannot be changed without the majority consent of investors; the parent company must maintain its legal standing, or it will trigger default clauses; any major decisions (such as Token Launch) must receive consent from directors appointed by investors. These clauses must be clearly written into the investment from the outset, rather than being patched up after problems arise.

  • Do not blindly trust lead investors. Even the top funds in the industry may have blind spots or undisclosed conflicts of interest in their due diligence. Independent, cross-verified background checks (Reference Checks) are indispensable. Investors must take responsibility for their own funds based on their independent judgment.

Case Two: The "Evaporation" of Value ------ Entity Switching and Dilution of Early Investors

[Case Keywords: Entity Segmentation, Entity Switching Dilution]

Another type of structural risk is more insidious and often occurs within a "legal" framework.

In 2021, amidst the market frenzy, we invested in a technology company focused on formal verification. The team consisted of experts with top academic backgrounds, demonstrating strong technical capabilities and consistently showing great respect towards investors, fostering a harmonious cooperative relationship.

However, about two to three years later, we gradually discovered that the founders began to build a brand new token issuance entity, intending to advance the token project under an entity completely separate from the originally invested company. Even more unacceptable was that this new entity neither recognized early equity investors nor attempted to include them in the new token rights framework.

From a legal perspective, their actions were technically flawless: the new entity was independently registered, and the original investment contracts did not directly bind the actions of this new entity. But from a business logic standpoint, this was a systematic deprivation of value from early investors—early investors nurtured a team and technology with their funds and trust, only for these resources to "sprout anew" in the new entity, while the original equity structure was quietly undermined.

We subsequently represented all early investors in difficult negotiations with the founders for several months, arguing our case and insisting on our rightful claims. Ultimately, we secured more favorable valuation terms for early investors than those for new round investors. However, this process nearly exhausted our relationship with the founders.

This incident made us acutely aware that entity switching can be one of the most "elegant" ways of value plundering.

Case Conclusion

  • Include "entity switching protection clauses" in investment agreements. Clearly stipulate that if the founders establish a new affiliated entity and advance the issuance of core assets (especially tokens) within a certain number of years after the investment (recommended 2-3 years), early investors should receive corresponding equity shares. This clause should be included in the agreement at the time of the initial investment, rather than being patched up after problems arise.

  • Governance rights are more important than valuation. Board seats, rights to be informed and consent regarding significant structural changes are the last line of defense for protecting early investors' interests. Relying solely on relationships and trust is insufficient.

Case Three: When Humanity Becomes a Variable ------ Rescue Financing and Commitment Failure

[Case Keywords: Remedies Structurally Weakened]

If the first two cases were about the cold game of law and structure, this case is filled with the entanglements of human relationships and humanity. Sometimes, what breaks you is not the complex terms, but a face that changes rapidly in the face of interests.

That was during the deepest part of the bear market, when one of our early investments was running out of funds and on the verge of collapse. The founder earnestly expressed that there was no money left on the books, and without new funding, operations could not be sustained.

Out of a desire to protect our existing investment and a glimmer of hope for the project, we decided to lend a helping hand, conducting a round of rescue financing (Down-round) at a lower valuation. The founder was deeply grateful at the time.

Once the funds were received, the project was able to continue. The market soon warmed up, and the sector where the project was located became a hotspot. The founder managed to hold on to the windfall with this "lifeline" and, coupled with excellent narrative skills, ultimately secured follow-on investments from well-known institutions and successfully listed on mainstream exchanges.

However, communication with the founder became exceptionally difficult afterward. When the investors wanted them to fulfill their initial commitments, the other party began a series of excuses—from initially refusing to distribute tokens to investors due to the Coinbase listing requirements, to delaying with various reasons such as illness and family issues. The entire process lasted for months. Ultimately, it came down to a showdown: either accept the same terms as other new investors or walk away. The initial goodwill of assistance was disregarded in the face of enormous interests.

Fortunately, our legal and post-investment teams never gave up. Through long-term, patient communication and rights protection, we ultimately recovered the vast majority of the tokens owed. However, this experience revealed a fundamental issue: The change in the interest landscape can systematically alter human behavior. This is not a pessimistic view of human nature, but a variable that should be designed into the contract structure in advance.

Case Conclusion

  • All business commitments, regardless of size, must be implemented in legally binding formal documents. One should not relax the requirements for legal documents simply because the other party appears humble. Business decisions should always be based on worst-case scenario assumptions. Rescue financing during a bear market often occurs at moments of the greatest information asymmetry and emotional pressure—precisely when it is easiest to relax legal requirements. The lower the other party's stance and the greater our negotiation advantage, the more we must insist on writing all commitments into formal agreements.

  • Given the scarcity of contractual spirit, it is essential to design clauses with "teeth" to ensure the execution of agreements. Investment agreements must clearly specify default responsibilities. For example, if the other party fails to fulfill specific terms, it will trigger high penalties or grant investors the right to purchase more tokens at a very low price. The cost of default must be significantly higher than the potential benefits gained from betrayal. At the same time, ensure that investors have sufficient negotiation leverage, such as board seats, veto rights on major matters, or joint control over the company's bank accounts and multi-signature wallets.

  • Before deciding on a rescue, first answer a fundamental question: What is the root cause of this team's financial crisis? Can their values withstand pressure testing? Adhering to transparency and compliance is not a lack of trust in the founders but the most basic protection of the relationship between both parties.

Case Four: Governance Failure—The Cost of Silence

[Case Keywords: Governance Symbolized]

There is a type of risk that is neither a loophole in the legal structure nor a subjective betrayal by the founder, but rather the absence of investors at critical moments.

We once invested in a promising Web3 infrastructure project. Behind the project was a well-respected and financially strong major shareholder, which was one of the important reasons we were optimistic about the project. However, during a company-wide meeting, this major shareholder publicly dismissed the CEO, catching the entire team off guard.

We later learned about this from the dismissed CEO, rather than from the official notification of the project.

At that time, the judgment was that this was merely a normal management adjustment and did not constitute a crisis signal that required immediate intervention. There were no requests for audits, no calls for special shareholder meetings, and no initiation of evaluation procedures; silence and observation were chosen.

About six months to a year later, the new management announced that the foundation was being liquidated. We ultimately recovered less than 20% of our initial investment.

In hindsight, the sudden dismissal of the CEO was the clearest warning signal of the project's decline. When a company undergoes significant abnormal management changes, it often means that the core governance structure has developed deep cracks. At that time, what investors should do is immediately demand an independent audit and intervene in governance reconstruction, rather than standing by.

Case Conclusion

  • List significant governance events as mandatory "intervention trigger points." Investment agreements should specify that significant events such as abnormal CEO departures, changes in core shareholders, or the initiation of lawsuits or arbitration will automatically trigger special rights for investors, including the demand for independent financial audits, calling special shareholder meetings, and suspending major financial expenditures.

  • Continuous monitoring, rather than passive waiting. Post-investment management should not stop at routine quarterly updates. Investors need to establish proactive information-gathering channels, including maintaining communication with core project employees (not just the founders), and suggest requiring the project to provide independent updates from the CFO/CTO level each quarter in the post-investment agreement, rather than relying solely on a single channel through the founder.

Case Five: The Halo of Resume—The Black Hole of Character

[Case Keywords: Governance Symbolized, Relief Path Structurally Weakened]

In the investment world, it is often said, "Investing is investing in people." However, we are too easily deceived by a shiny resume. Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, top hedge funds… these names seem to carry a halo, leading people to subconsciously equate "elite background" with "professional, disciplined, reliable." But the harsh reality is that sometimes, the most dangerous individuals are precisely these "golden boys." Wall Street training has taught them how to package narratives, exploit rules, and manipulate emotions. These abilities are not inherently good or bad, but when misused, their destructive power far exceeds imagination.

We once "luckily" missed out on a project. The founder's resume was impeccable, having risen to an executive position at Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan Chase before starting his own venture. His project was an "absolutely fair" on-chain casino. The story was compelling, and the team was luxurious, attracting many well-known institutions in the industry. However, due to our significant concerns about the compliance risks of the "casino" sector, after multiple discussions with the founder about compliance paths yielded no results, our risk control department ultimately rejected the investment.

The twist in the story occurred the day after we made our decision. The project announced it had completed financing of several million dollars. However, just minutes after the funds were received, the founder began transferring the company's money into his personal wallet. In the following week, he lost millions of dollars in another on-chain casino app. He promised to build a fair casino but ended up using the money meant for building the casino to gamble in someone else's establishment. This was not a failure of risk management; it was blatant fraud and embezzlement. Ultimately, the FBI intervened, the founder was arrested, and faced years in prison.

Another case we experienced was a 3A game masterpiece touted as the "on-chain Call of Duty." The team members came from top game studios, but the project's burn rate was terrifying, reaching two to three million dollars a month, while the development progress was severely lagging. The company quickly fell into financial crisis, cutting its team from over a hundred to just a dozen.

Just as the building was about to collapse, we discovered that the project's co-founder and CTO had been continuously selling his team's tokens on the secondary market for seven months, cashing out nearly $700,000. Legally, he was selling his vested shares, which seemed unassailable. However, from a business ethics perspective, with the company hanging by a thread and many employees laid off, as one of the core leaders, he was cashing out like crazy. The signal this sent to the market was unmistakable: "The ship is sinking; I'm jumping first."

In both of these cases, investors overly focused on the founder's past halo while neglecting to conduct an in-depth examination of their current character and behavioral patterns. Additionally, the lack of key controls such as "multi-signature" and "milestone payments" directly contributed to the loss of control over funds.

Case Conclusion

  • Character due diligence (Character DD) must take precedence. Resumes can be embellished, stories can be packaged, but a person's character and behavioral patterns are relatively stable. Investment institutions need to establish a more systematic methodology for character due diligence, which should not only include routine background checks but may also require deeper interviews and even behavioral stress testing. It is especially important to pay attention to whether there are fundamental contradictions between the founder's personal history and the project mission they claim. A person with a gambling record starting a casino is a huge red flag.

  • Fund control is a non-negotiable investment bottom line. For early-stage projects, especially those dominated by a single founder, all funds must not be placed in a wallet completely controlled by that individual. Multi-signature wallets should be a mandatory requirement, and investors or their designated, trusted third parties must be one of the signatories. The release of funds should be based on clear, quantifiable milestones; complete one task before releasing the next tranche of funds. These risk control measures, which have long been mature in the traditional VC industry, should be strictly enforced in the crypto industry.

  • Bind the interests of the core team deeply to the long-term development of the project. The unlocking of team tokens should not only be time-based but should also be tied to project milestones, such as product launches, reaching a certain number of users, or achieving a certain level of protocol revenue. Additionally, the agreement should explicitly state that during financial distress or major crises, the token sales of core members will be restricted. This serves both as a constraint and a stance, demonstrating to the community and all investors the team's commitment to the project's survival.

Conclusion: Return to Common Sense, Navigate Through Cycles

After experiencing so much, we are no longer the passionate "Web3 believers." We have become more like realists, risk assessors, and observers of human nature. We no longer easily get excited by grand narratives; instead, we scrutinize every detail like auditors and test every assumption like engineers.

When evaluating a project, we now repeatedly ask ourselves:

  • Do we really know this founder? Beyond the story they tell, have we learned from their former colleagues, bosses, or even competitors what kind of person they are?

  • Do we truly understand the legal structure of this project? Are there hidden "backdoors"? If the founder runs away, is the contract we hold a worthless piece of paper or a sharp sword?

  • After injecting funds, do we have control over their use? Or can we only hope for the founder's moral consciousness?

  • Are the interests of the founding team and those of us investors truly aligned? Is their token unlocking mechanism designed to encourage long-term building or to facilitate short-term cashing out?

  • When we detect signs of problems, do we have the courage to say no?

Ultimately, a good investment structure is not designed to guard against gentlemen; it is meant to guard against extreme situations. When everyone is dignified, any structure operates smoothly; the real test is whether the contract in your hand can speak for you when interests diverge, markets change dramatically, and trust collapses.

These lessons have cost us real money. Writing them down is because we believe that the cost of industry progress should not be repeatedly paid by every new generation of entrants.

For this reason, we have systematically introduced mechanisms such as continuous compliance monitoring, entity-switching protection clauses, and mandatory multi-signature wallets into our investment process. These are not mere paper improvements but institutional upgrades that have emerged after repeated real costs.

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