From start to giving up, why I stopped doing Web3 payments
Author: Yokiiiya
In the past six months, I transitioned from a bystander in Web3 to someone inside the payment industry. And now, I choose to stop and no longer pursue Web3 payments.
This is not a retreat after failure, but a judgment adjustment made after truly engaging in the field. Over the past six months, I have visited Yiwu, Shuibei, Putian, and even Mexico, to see how payments are actually made in the most vibrant places mentioned in reports. I also got involved, built an MVP for Web3 payments, took on accounts, created Web3 collection tools, and tried to run the imagined path from the first step to the last.
But the deeper I went, the clearer I became about one thing: this is not an industry where "making a good product guarantees success." Payment is not about functionality, but about banking relationships, licenses, capital efficiency, and the long-term ability to manage risk.
Many payment businesses that seem "profitable" are essentially not earning a capability premium, but a risk premium—it's just that nothing has gone wrong yet. What truly determines how far a payment company can go is never how much money it has made, but whether it can still endure and survive before the risks become apparent.
This article is not meant to deny this industry, but rather to hope to remove the filter, lay bare the real structure, and leave some clearer judgments for those who come after. (A few weeks ago, I also recorded a podcast with former Kun Global VP Robert, Nayuta Capital CEO, and former Didi Finance CEO Alex, discussing the same issues.)

1. Why did I enter Web3 payments?
As a serial entrepreneur, I ended a long-standing entrepreneurial project last year. During the process of closing the company, I also allowed myself a period of rest to return to a more "cleared" position and seriously consider what direction to focus my energy on next.
Six months ago, a friend invited me to Hong Kong to try out entrepreneurship related to Web3 payments. At that time, I was not familiar with Web3 itself and had little understanding of the payment industry. From a macro perspective, it was obviously a sufficiently large industry that was still in an upward cycle, and there was potential for a combination of Web3 and AI.
In my previous entrepreneurial endeavors, we had engaged in cross-border business and developed platforms and software related to remote work. In these practices, I kept encountering the same fact: businesses can quickly go global, but the flow of funds always lags behind. Slow settlements, fragmented paths, opaque costs, and uncontrollable payment terms—these issues might be bypassed with experience and patience when the scale is small; but once the business scales up, they won't be solved by "management capability," but will only be exacerbated. Money cannot flow as freely as information, and this is an invisible limit for many global businesses.
It was against this backdrop that when I began to systematically understand the actual use of Web3 payments in the clearing and settlement layer, it presented not an abstract technical narrative, but a solution that could logically address these pain points: faster settlement speeds, higher transparency, and almost round-the-clock clearing capabilities.
At that time, it seemed to be a direction that could solve real problems and was Day 1 Global—I was not entering because of Web3 itself, but because it appeared to offer a better structure in the specific context of payments—at least logically, it seemed capable of leveraging those long-standing but overlooked frictions.
But looking back now, I gradually realized that, like many others, I had assumed a premise that was later continuously challenged by reality: as long as the clearing and settlement efficiency is high enough, payments would naturally migrate to the chain. It was even further simplified into an intuition—payments are just about facilitating transactions; as long as the process is smooth, cash flow can be "handcrafted."
Based on my lack of understanding of Web3 and the payment industry, I decided to spend three months truly immersing myself in this industry, clarifying the structure, and then deciding what to do and from what position to do it.
2. What really matters in payments is never the product
When I arrived in Hong Kong, the initial idea was not complicated. The initial thought was simple: relying on some resources and relationships my friend already had, I would start from OTC or relatively simple payment scenarios, get the cash flow running first, and then determine what to do next based on real demand.
I was not there to conduct research, nor to observe long-term; I wanted to see— is it possible to first create something that works, and then calibrate the direction in real business?
But soon, the external environment underwent a noticeable acceleration. In May, the U.S. passed the GENIUS Act, and the entire industry was almost ignited overnight. Capital, projects, and entrepreneurs flooded in, and Web3 payments transformed from a relatively niche infrastructure topic into a frequently discussed "new opportunity." From the outside, this was a positive development; but for a newly entered entrepreneurial team, this sudden excitement was not necessarily a good thing.
The more mixed, noisy, and rapidly formed consensus moments are, the easier it is to obscure the real issues. Internet giants, financial institutions, banks, traditional Web2 payment companies, and Web3 native teams all entered the fray, everyone was talking about opportunities, but few were discussing structure. At that time, I felt it was even more necessary to dive into the front lines to truly understand this industry.
1. The "excitement" in reports is not the same as what is seen on the front lines
Once I started running on the front lines, the first thing I did was not to continue optimizing product solutions, but to see: who is actually using Web3 payments? Why are they using it? Where are they using it? I first went to Yiwu, which is frequently mentioned in many studies and shares as a representative sample of "Web3 payments already scaled up."
In many studies and shares, Yiwu is often used as a representative sample of "Web3 payments already scaled up." But after walking around, I saw a different picture. Stablecoins do exist, but more often they are fragmented, relationship-driven, and hidden uses.
It has not become a standardized, productized settlement method as described in the reports. Many transactions are not because of "optimal efficiency." I then went to Shuibei, Putian, and Mexico, and also learned about the penetration rates in Africa, Argentina, and other places; the situation was not fundamentally different.
Web3 payments do exist, but they have not formed a stable, scalable main path; more often, they are just a "patch" embedded in the existing system. The real penetration rate does not match the heat we perceive in reports, communities, and discussions.
But it was also through these exchanges that I gradually shifted my perspective from "can we create a product" to the industry structure itself. I began to realize that the incremental market for stablecoins is likely not within the "crypto circle," but in the existing business scenarios in the Web2 world that have long been slowed down by traditional clearing and settlement systems.
This is not a narrative shift, but more like a slowly occurring fintech upgrade. Meanwhile, problems began to surface: if real usage is so fragmented, can the productization path hold up?
2. When we truly start to create applications, all problems point to the same place: channels
From July to September, I continued field research while systematically engaging with potential clients. Human resources companies, insurance, tourism, MCN agencies, service trade, cross-border businesses, gaming companies… the demands varied, but the core issues pointed to a high degree of consistency: money should flow faster, cheaper, and more stably.
Payroll, task settlements, B2B payments—these scenarios are logically very suitable for stablecoins. Initially, we thought the application layer was a direction we could enter. But soon, an unavoidable premise presented itself: you must have stable, compliant, and sustainable fiat ⇄ crypto channels.
We began to connect with several service providers that seemed promising in the market, but after real experiences, it was hard to say that any channel was "long-term reliable." To meet business needs, we even tried to build our own channels, but only realized after getting started that this was not a product issue, but an infrastructure issue.
Banking relationships, license structures, KYB/KYC compliance, risk control capabilities, quota management, regulatory communication… the entire channel layer heavily relies on long-term accumulated credit, experience, and capital, which are not capabilities that a small team from an internet background can quickly fill in.
It was here that I first truly realized: payment is not an industry where "making a good product guarantees success."
3. You think you are making money, but you are actually eating risk premiums
During this process, one phrase deeply resonated with me: payment is not about how much you earn, but how much you can spend. Many Web3 payment paths that seem to have already "worked" are essentially not capability premiums, but risk premiums.
The more dangerous aspect is that many people do not know what risks they are taking on, nor where those risks are specifically hidden.
Is it the compliance issues of counterparties?
Is it the mismatch in the structure of the fund pool?
Is it the lag in risk control rules?
Or is it the gray area of regulatory interpretation?
If the feasibility of a business is based on "nothing has gone wrong for now," then it is not a structure that can be safely scaled.
4. The essence of payment is a "flow of water" business.
Slowly, I began to understand payments from a simpler perspective. The essence of payment is actually a "flow of water" business. Whoever controls the waterway can make money; the larger the flow from the faucet, the greater the profit potential. If the water flows past your door, you can take a cut—this sounds like an almost "easy money" business.
But precisely because of this, payment has never been a simple business. Not every company "standing by the water" can make money. The payment companies that truly make money in the long term are often those that have strong control over water volume, pressure, backflow, pollution, and leakage.
How much water you can take in depends on how much risk you can bear; how long you can let the water flow depends on your tolerance under compliance, risk control, and regulatory environments. Many paths that seem to have a "large flow" are essentially just ones where no one has come to close the valve yet. It was also during this process that I developed a more complex but also more genuine respect for the payment industry.
Its charm lies not in who has created a new product, but in—it will very honestly tell you which industries are truly making money in the real world and which are just making a lot of noise. Standing on the waterway, you can see where the real funds are flowing, rather than who is constantly PR-ing from the outside.
5. Payment is a good business, but it is not the kind of business we can excel in
Having come this far, I also had to face a judgment that is not easy for entrepreneurs but is very important. Payment is a good business, but it is not the type of business we can do best. This is not a denial of direction, but a respect for resource endowments.
What the payment industry truly needs is not the ability to quickly trial and error and continuously iterate products, but long-term stable banking relationships, sustainable compliance systems, mature risk control capabilities, and the credit accumulated after repeated negotiations in a regulatory environment. These capabilities are not something that can be "achieved with a bit of effort," nor can they be quickly filled in through cleverness or hard work. They are more like industry-level assets, which often only gradually form within specific types of teams and specific time windows.
When I truly viewed payment as a "flow business," I also became more clearly aware that what determines whether a team can long-term stand on the waterway is not whether they want to, but whether they have that set of pressure-bearing structures.
Under this premise, continuing to push forward is no longer a rational investment for us, but more like using time and luck to fight against an industry structure that does not stand on our side. This issue ultimately led me to the next choice.
3. I still have faith in payments, but I see its true battlefield clearly
It should be noted that my choice to no longer continue with Web3 payments is not because I am bearish on this industry. On the contrary, over the past six months, I have become increasingly convinced that the structural opportunities in the payment industry are still very large.
However, when I truly break down these opportunities, I gradually realize a more brutal but equally important thing—payment is a business with a longer time cycle, heavier structure, and higher resource requirements. Its opportunities exist, but they are not evenly distributed beneath every entrepreneurial team.
1. The incremental growth in payments is not a short-term dividend, but a long-term reconstruction
If we extend our perspective, cross-border payments are not a question of "whether it can explode," but rather a process of ongoing infrastructure reconstruction. The continuous overflow of global supply chains, growth in cross-border service trade, and acceleration of distributed team collaboration are trends that are amplifying the friction in traditional clearing and settlement systems.
In this process, the value of Web3 payments does not lie in "being cheaper," but in three aspects:
Significant improvement in turnover efficiency
Transparency of clearing paths
Unified settlement capabilities across currency zones and regulatory zones
This is a structural improvement, not a tactical optimization. Because of this, it inherently belongs to a project spanning a decade, rather than a market that can be leveraged through product sprints.
2. The real challenge is not "collecting money," but the funding system within the Marketplace
After engaging with enough real scenarios on the front lines, I became increasingly clear that the difficulty in payments has long since moved beyond "collecting money" itself. Especially in Marketplace scenarios, payment is never an independent component, but a complete ecosystem-level funding system.
Buyers, sellers, platforms, logistics, streamers, delivery personnel, tax authorities, frozen accounts, subsidy accounts—all roles are interlinked within the same funding chain. In such a system, the real threshold is not the payment interface, but:
Custody and freezing mechanisms
Revenue sharing and payment term design
Risk control and anti-fraud capabilities
Compliance and regulatory obligations across regions
Once these systems stabilize, they naturally have the potential to extend into financial capabilities; but at the same time, they also place extremely high demands on the team's financial strength, risk control systems, and long-term patience.
3. Web3 payments are not a front-end revolution, but a back-end upgrade
One point I have become increasingly certain of over the past six months is that the true scaling of Web3 payments will not happen at the user end.
It will not explode because users start actively using wallets, but because enterprises begin upgrading their treasury, reconciliation systems, cross-border settlement paths, and fund pool management methods.
In other words, the mainstream path is likely to be: the front end remains Web2, while the back end undergoes Web3 reconstruction. This is a "hidden" upgrade. And this upgrade precisely means it relies more on system stability, compliance certainty, and long-term operational capability, rather than market education.
The real explosion point is not in the most mature markets. If viewed regionally, the incremental growth in payments is also not balanced.
The Asia-Pacific region is already a relatively mature market, while true structural growth is more likely to occur in regions like Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia:
Severely fragmented payment systems
High costs and complex paths
Stronger willingness for users and merchants to migrate
But the other side of these markets is: highly localized, strong regulatory differences, and strong operational requirements. What they need is not "cleverness," but long-term deep cultivation.
When I truly looked at these opportunities together, I had to face a clear conclusion: payment is indeed a good business, but the resource endowments it requires—
Long-term stable banking relationships
Mature, sustainable compliance systems
Risk control capabilities that can withstand pressure testing
Credit accumulated after repeated negotiations in a regulatory environment
are not within the current capability boundaries of our team. This is not a denial of direction, but a respect for reality. The battlefield for payments still exists, but it is no longer beneath our feet. It was under this judgment that I ultimately chose to stop and rethink: if I do not stand on the waterway, where else can I stand to continue participating in this ongoing structural change?
Four, After deciding not to continue with payments
When I truly made the decision to no longer continue with Web3 payments, there was no strong sense of "ending." It felt more like a phase of exploration had finally reached a point where it was time to stop. I have not left this industry. I have merely shifted from trying to stand on the waterway to observe how the water flows and where it ultimately leads.
In the repeated dissection of payment structures, one judgment became increasingly clear: payment addresses the flow problem, whether money can move and how quickly it can move; but what truly determines long-term value is never the flow itself, but—where the money stops after flowing and how it is managed.
Looking back at the development path of China's fintech over the past twenty years, this logic is actually very clear. Payment is just the entry point, the balance is the transfer station, and what truly forms scale and barriers is the subsequent fund management and asset allocation system. Yu'ebao, Tiantian Fund, Tianhong did not succeed because "payments were done better," but because they stood behind payments, accepting and reorganizing the already scaled fund flows.
Payment is the entrance, but not the endpoint. Putting this structure back into the Web3 world, I also see similar issues gradually emerging. A large number of asset forms that are not aggressive but sufficiently robust have already appeared on-chain—lending, short-duration RWA, neutral strategies, composite products… They resemble on-chain money market funds, short-term bond funds, and stable allocation tools. The real problem is not "whether there are assets," but rather: most people do not know what risks they are facing and lack an entry point to understand, compare, and judge these assets.
As more and more funds begin to flow on-chain, this problem will only become more pronounced. It was also at this juncture that I began to realize: if I do not continue with payments, I can still stay in this change in another way. Instead of competing for the waterway, I can clarify the structure of the water flow, lay out the boundaries and risks, and let people know which areas are worth staying in and which require extra caution. This is also the direction I will continue to explore with my team.
This article is not a conclusion on Web3 payments, nor is it an attempt to persuade anyone to enter or exit; it is merely an attempt to clarify why I chose not to continue with payments. I hope it can provide some reference for those who come after, perhaps helping them avoid some detours.
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