How to build stablecoin payment channels in 16 emerging markets, listen to Chirs tell the real story behind Yellow Card

In this episode of Stableminded, Drew engages in a conversation with Chris Maurice, co-founder of Yellow Card Financial, exploring how they have built the largest licensed stablecoin payment infrastructure in emerging markets such as Africa, Southeast Asia, and South America.

Chris takes us through the development of Yellow Card: the company launched in Nigeria in 2019, initially as a local crypto product, and gradually evolved into the preferred infrastructure provider for banks, financial institutions, and multinational corporations for cross-border transactions in emerging markets. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the company experienced a dramatic turning point—its transaction volume nearly doubled overnight from $1 million per month to $1 million per day. However, the real structural shift occurred after they launched USDT. Within just four months, 99% of the transaction volume migrated from Bitcoin to stablecoins. It was during this process that they realized a key fact: customers were not looking to invest in cryptocurrencies, but rather wanted "dollars that can actually be used for payments." The conversation further reveals an important yet often overlooked competitive advantage: building a business locally in Lagos, Nigeria, creates a moat that is nearly impossible to replicate. Chris explains that the real challenge is not the stablecoin or blockchain infrastructure—those parts are relatively "simple"; the real difficulty lies in the fiat rails.

In many emerging market countries, frequent bank outages are the norm. To ensure a payment ultimately succeeds, Yellow Card needs to connect to six or more banks as redundancy in certain countries. Chris mentions that some companies have raised $30 million in funding trying to replicate Yellow Card's network, but failed to even launch a product because they could not cope with the following complexities:

• Long-term accumulation and maintenance of local bank relationships

• Outdated and fragmented financial infrastructure

• Huge institutional, cultural, and operational differences between countries

Drew:
You are listening to Season 6 of Stableminded, supported by Rain. Rain helps financial teams build and manage stablecoin-based card projects. Through an API, Rain enables you to issue branded cards and unlock new revenue streams. With Rain, users can compliantly and instantly transfer, store, and use stablecoins in over 150 countries. In this season, we will explore how Visa, Crossmint, Yellow Card, Arculus, and Wyoming are embedding stablecoin flows into their businesses. For more information, visit rain.xyz.

Chris, thank you for joining the show. How are you doing today?

Chris Maurice:
Not very stable (laughs). Unlike stablecoins, I’m not pegged to the dollar; I’m always fluctuating. Thanks for asking.

Drew:
Where are you right now? Where are you connecting from?

Chris:
I’ve been running around everywhere. In a way, I’m kind of "homeless," but I try to maintain a base.

Drew:
You often attend industry events around the world. Let’s start with the big picture: what kind of company is Yellow Card from a product perspective? With so many different countries and markets you serve, how do you lead such a team?

Chris:
I think one of our biggest advantages is that we started hiring in April 2020. At that time, the world felt like it was ending; nothing seemed important, and everyone was wondering, "Is this the end?" Because of that, we were forced to do remote work very well from day one. From the beginning, we had to build various tools and processes to cope with remote work, cross-country collaboration, and different teams operating simultaneously in different countries.

It’s a bit ironic that now everyone is pushing for "return to the office," but honestly, with AI now, remote work is much easier than before. You can have a clear grasp of everything happening in the company while working remotely. I think that’s fantastic.

Drew:
While preparing for this interview, I watched some of your previous talks and interviews. Honestly, your early entrepreneurial experiences left a strong impression on me. You come across as someone who is constantly creating and building new things. From making Lombardi trophy replicas to that "Bitcoin exchange" experience at Taco Bell (laughs).

Of course, we don’t need to go into all of that, but I think this background is very important for understanding Yellow Card and what you’re doing now. Yellow Card isn’t your first project where you’ve invested all your energy. You’ve done a lot before. I want to ask directly: do you think that "constant creation and tinkering" trait has been with you since you were young?

Chris:
I think I’m just a bit crazy.

Drew:
Are you the kind of person who thinks they’re perfectly normal but seems a bit off to outsiders?

Chris:
Yes (laughs). Like drooling in front of the mirror at 3 AM. But seriously, this has always been a way for me to think about the world. For example, my dad has always run his own business and has almost never worked for anyone else. My mom, on the other hand, has spent her life doing the same job.

I’ve seen both kinds of lives, and I’ve always been clear: I want to do my own thing. I want to find ways to create value and run a company that I genuinely find interesting, rather than being constantly watched and directed on what to do. In the early days, you really don’t know what the direction will be. You can only keep trying, throwing things at the wall to see what sticks. Gradually, some things start to work. And I’ve always felt that one of the key criteria for judging whether an idea is worth pursuing is: are there other people willing to do this with you?

Drew:
I completely agree. Because everyone has ideas, but most ideas aren’t worth executing. If someone is willing to say, "Okay, let’s put everything else down and try this together," that’s basically the strongest external validation. So in the early stages of Yellow Card, what were the key moments that transformed "an idea" into "a real thing"? Does the Taco Bell experience count as part of Yellow Card? If there are listeners unfamiliar with that story, could you briefly share it?

Chris:
That was before Yellow Card.

Drew:
Okay.

Chris:
Actually, it was my co-founder who brought me into this industry. I first encountered Bitcoin around 2013. And Justin—my co-founder—is the kind of person who would go around "preaching" Bitcoin at parties. He’s over six feet tall, sweats a lot, and would spread the "gospel" of Bitcoin to six or seven people at college parties with open arms. You can imagine, Drew, how attractive that was to girls back then (laughs).

Drew:
Haha.

Chris:
In 2014, nothing was less appealing to college girls than "two sweaty guys talking about magical internet money." But that’s how Justin pulled me into this space. By 2015, I was completely down the rabbit hole, all in. We tried a lot of things in the U.S. One of them was: we advertised online, saying something like, "We have Bitcoin, come find us and exchange cash." Surprisingly, people actually responded. So we did what normal college students would do: every Wednesday at 7 PM, at the Taco Bell on Gay Street in Auburn, Alabama.

You could see Justin and me sitting there with a 12-pack of Doritos Locos Tacos. You’d slap a few hundred dollars in cash on the table, we’d scan your QR code, and then send you Bitcoin. I have to say: this worked extremely well. Taco Bell was the perfect venue. If it were Chick-fil-A, this operation would never have worked. After doing this for a few weeks, we suddenly realized, "Wait, this thing seems to be really taking off." So we started calling friends: LSU, Yale, Georgia, Alabama—anywhere we knew people from high school or college. Three weeks later, there were 7 Taco Bells in the Eastern U.S., all in college towns, where you could walk in and buy Bitcoin.

Drew:
What was the profile of the people walking into Taco Bell at that time? I’m wondering if it was those college girls from the parties, or completely different?

Chris Maurice:
Bro, it was basically all nerds (laughs). Really, almost entirely nerds. Of course, I can say that because I’m a nerd myself. I had been selling Pokémon cards online before that. But you have to understand one thing: at that point, getting Bitcoin quickly was actually very difficult.

Drew:
Right.

Chris:
The exchanges and various alternatives were slow. Essentially, what you were doing was:
You were buying Bitcoin in larger quantities and then acting like a "human ATM," distributing those Bitcoins at Taco Bell.

Chris:
At that time, the industry was still completely unoptimized. That was back when Circle was still selling Bitcoin. There were indeed some ways to buy, but the limits were very low. For example, at Circle, I remember you could only buy $300 a week.

So what we were actually doing was: using my account and his account, we were frantically aggregating limits on all the platforms we could use to buy as much as possible. Then we’d sell to those who wanted to buy a few hundred dollars at once, rather than being limited to "a week of $300." Clearly, this approach is impossible today. Platforms like Coinbase have done an excellent job for ordinary users in the U.S. But in 2015 and 2016, those platforms were far from ready.

Drew:
Now back to Yellow Card itself. You previously mentioned those "aha moments." You’ve done many projects, had many collaborations, and pitched ideas to many people you trust and care about throughout your life.

In the early days of Yellow Card, what moments made you feel, "This problem is really important, this thing can really work"? Including funding milestones and those moments of "suddenly leveling up." What do you think were the most critical early milestones?

Chris:
I think the real "oh" moment actually came a bit later. We launched in Nigeria in June 2019. After launching, it took about a month to reach our first $100,000 in transaction volume. By the end of 2019, we were doing about $1 million per month. At that time, we thought, "Wow, this is amazing." It felt like everything was heading in the right direction.

Chris:
Then COVID hit. At first, the whole world became very chaotic. Everything moved online, and no one knew what would happen next. During that initial period, our transaction volume dropped a bit because everyone was thinking, "Is the world ending?" "Who’s buying Bitcoin now?"

But then, things took a very dramatic turn. The transaction volume suddenly started to skyrocket. We almost overnight went from $1 million per month to $1 million per day.

Drew:
What did that moment feel like for you?

Chris:
That was the moment. We realized, "Oh no, we really have to operate like a legitimate company now."

Before that, we were more of a group of people:

• Building products

• Selling things

• Solving problems

• Figuring out how to get things running

But from that moment on, things changed. Employees started asking:

• Where are the contracts?

• What about social security?

• What are the policies?

So you suddenly realize: okay, we need to have HR, we need to have policies, we need to have processes.

Drew:
This happened when Bitcoin prices were actually crashing. I remember vividly that feeling in early 2020—everything was collapsing, and Bitcoin was going down too.

Chris:
Right, it dropped from over $10,000 to around $5,000 or $6,000.

Drew:
Exactly. I remember that sense of despair: "Is Bitcoin done for?" So at that moment, what were those users doing? Was that $1 million per day all going into buying Bitcoin, or were other use cases starting to emerge?

Chris:
At that time, we basically only supported Bitcoin. There might have been Ethereum, but honestly, no one wanted to pay $50 in fees to transfer $5 (laughs). So the vast majority of transactions were still Bitcoin. But looking back now, what users were doing then is actually the same as now. We just didn’t realize it at the time.

Our initial idea was: "We want to be the African version of Coinbase." We wanted to create an exchange that made it easier for people to access this new technology. But the real stablecoin "aha moment" came at the end of 2020 and the beginning of 2021. That’s when we launched USDT.

When USDT first launched, the transaction volume structure was as follows:

• 100% Bitcoin

• 0% stablecoins

Not long after launching, it changed to:

• 70% Bitcoin

• 30% USDT

And within just 4 months, we became: 99% USDT.

Drew:
So basically, almost everyone switched to stablecoins.

Chris:
Yes, almost 100% of user behavior switched. That was also the first time we really sat down and asked ourselves a question: what are people actually using these things for? Initially, we thought: users buy virtual assets for investment, to hedge against inflation, for asset allocation, for storage.

Drew:
The logic of "store of value."

Chris:
Yes, storing value is certainly part of it; I don’t deny that. But the vast majority of demand is actually for payments. It’s for international payments. It’s those payments in emerging markets where the traditional financial system simply doesn’t work.

Drew:
So during those 4 months, did you undergo a mindset shift from "we are an exchange, an asset platform" to "we are a global payments company"?

Chris:
Absolutely. And from a business model perspective, many people might think: "Stablecoins don’t sound that profitable."

Drew:
Right, if there’s no volatility, how do you make a profit?

Chris:
But for us, that was never a problem. Because we are not doing dollar-to-dollar stablecoins. We are doing conversions between currencies like pesos, rand, shillings, and stablecoins. As long as it’s not "dollars for dollars," the market always exists. You’re helping users buy and sell dollar stablecoins with their local currency.

And the real cognitive shift is: people don’t care about Bitcoin. They don’t care about Ethereum, they don’t care about Solana. They only care about one thing: dollars. And stablecoins are a more usable dollar.

Drew:
So after you completed the shift from "exchange thinking" to "payments company," what was the part that you found most difficult and painful? Was it licensing? Was it product? Or was it sales? From that moment of "we are now a stablecoin payments company," what do you think was the hardest battle you fought to truly make this happen?

Chris:
Honestly, these things have each been a problem at different stages. Whether it’s sales, product, or organization and scaling, these are always challenges. But if you ask me what has always been the hardest, it’s been fiat. Stablecoins are actually relatively "easy." I’m not saying building a stablecoin system has no difficulties—there are certainly many details, nuances, and technical considerations. But compared to fiat, stablecoins are incredibly simple.

**Because stablecoins are open technology. You just need to *build it*. But fiat is different. Fiat requires "permission." It’s a completely different game. And every country has a completely different regulatory attitude towards "how banks should participate in this space."

Historically, the dollar has always been the hardest choke point. A series of events in the U.S. has made this extremely difficult for a long time. For a while, we could only work with some very bad banks. Only recently have we finally been able to upgrade to better banks on the dollar side, more aligned with "real institutional banks."
Another reality that many overlook is: banks do not operate 100% normally. In the U.S., people are used to the banking system almost never going down. But in many other parts of the world, bank outages are the norm. Not just banks, local alternative payment methods often go down too. So one thing you must do on the fiat side is: have enough redundancy. Suppose I need to pay you 1,000 pesos, 1,000 shillings, 1,000 pula; I must ensure that: this money arrives at the right time, truly. In some countries, we need to connect to six or more banks, and the only goal is to ensure that a payment ultimately succeeds. Because you never know: which bank will go down today.

Drew:
The fact that you need six banks just to ensure a payment succeeds speaks volumes.

Chris:
Exactly. And everyone knows the technical capabilities of banks. They are not known for having "easy systems and clear interfaces."

Drew:
Do you think it’s these pain points—the U.S. choke point, the systemic issues of banks in emerging markets, the extremely complex and misunderstood market environment—that define Yellow Card and allow you to survive?

Chris:
One hundred percent. Being willing to persist on the fiat side is the most important thing. Many companies have already given up. There are also many companies trying to replicate our network outside the U.S., but they haven’t succeeded. One well-known company raised about $30 million, and the result was: they didn’t even launch a product. They couldn’t really build the infrastructure in those markets. And we have been building that infrastructure for many years. The problem has never been "has anyone thought of this direction." The problem is: they can’t sustain this in the long term and in a stable manner.

Drew:
You previously mentioned a point that left a strong impression on me: "Africa is not a single market." Can you elaborate on this? And how did this understanding forge capabilities in your early business? Now that you’re bringing these capabilities to other regions, how do they play a role?

Chris Maurice:
This is actually why we were able to succeed in other parts of the world later on.

Chris:
In our early days, when we were focused solely on Africa, we learned something very important: no two countries are the same. So what we’ve really done over the years is not write a "one-size-fits-all process," but rather establish a principled playbook.

For example, regardless of the country, you need:

• Bank accounts

• Local entities

• Communication with regulators or central banks

• Local payment channels

These are common.

Chris:
But we never write down "how to achieve" it. Because in different countries, the ways to achieve these things vary greatly.

A very intuitive example: the differences between Nigeria and Botswana are roughly equivalent to those between Italy and China. But many people treat "Africa" as a whole. This is also a common misconception in South America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.

People say: "South American market," "Middle Eastern market," "African market." But in reality, the countries within these regions are completely different in culture, institutions, and business practices. Some countries don’t even get along with each other. But in the perception of outsiders, they are compressed into a "whole."

So if you want to succeed in international expansion, the most important point is: don’t enter a market with any preconceived notions. You must accept the fact that you know almost nothing about that country.

Drew:
This also means that the "adaptability" you established in Africa in the early days can later be transferred to other regions?

Chris:
Absolutely correct. It’s precisely because we faced extremely decentralized and complex situations in Africa that when we look at Southeast Asia, South America, and the Middle East later, you’ll find: the logic is the same. What you need to do essentially hasn’t changed:

• Find the right banks

• Understand local regulations

• Understand local business culture

• Build enough redundancy

But you absolutely cannot assume: "what works in this country will definitely work in the neighboring country."

Drew:
So is your personal focus still primarily on this expansion, or have you handed this part over to the team?

Chris:
Both. My core responsibility now can be summed up in one word: growth. How to move from where we are now to where we need to be. To be honest, no matter how fast we grow, it’s never fast enough. We’ve grown four times in 18 months, and investors are asking, "Why not five times?" So we go back to square one and break down the problem again. I’ll focus my time on the areas with the greatest growth potential. Recently, a very obvious source of growth has been East Asian customers.

At the same time, we also have a dedicated team within the company focused solely on one thing: geographical coverage. That is: more countries, more banks, more accounts, more fiat redundancy. This is something that will never end. We are always asking ourselves: where else can we go that others aren’t paying attention to? Where can we help businesses solve real problems?

Drew:
If you were to give advice to entrepreneurs who are expanding internationally and trying to establish relationships with governments and banks in unfamiliar countries, what would you say?

Chris:
I would say something that might not sound pleasant: throw away all the business common sense you think you understand. If you’re going to do business in a culture you haven’t grown up in, lived in, or understood, your first step is not to formulate a strategy, but to learn about that culture itself.
You need to understand:

• How people make decisions

• Who has the final say

• What is considered polite

• What is considered offensive

• What must be said in person

• What absolutely must not be said

Until you truly understand these things, you cannot establish effective relationships.

Drew:
Is there a specific country or experience that made you particularly aware of "oh, this is how things operate here"? Can you share an example that illustrates these cultural differences more concretely?

Chris Maurice:
There are really too many examples (laughs). But I can share one that had a significant impact on us in the early days.

Chris:
Nigerians are very direct. They are really very direct. If you know Nigerians, you’ll know: they will tell you their true thoughts directly at any time. They basically don’t hold back. But then look at places like Ghana and Botswana, even within the same region or continent, people behave completely differently. There, others might be very polite and friendly in person, but there could be problems that they won’t proactively tell you about. In that culture, you can’t wait for others to point out your problems. You need to realize for yourself: "Something might be off," and then proactively communicate, apologize, and explain.

It’s similar to the U.S.: in the South, people are superficially friendly, but behind your back, they might be gossiping about you; while in New York, people will directly tell you what you’re doing wrong. These differences themselves are not right or wrong. But if you don’t understand these differences, you will definitely mess things up.

Drew:
When you look ahead to the next one to three years, growth is what investors care about most. Do you feel more like, "We still have many markets to enter, so let’s keep going one by one," or have you already seen new growth methods and strategies?

Chris:
To be honest, at this stage, we are more focused on sales rather than expansion. The industry is developing too quickly; it’s essentially a land grab phase now. I’ve lost count of how many times we’ve approached clients, and they’ve told us, "Oh, we’re already using another company." But the reality is: that company hasn’t solved their problems at all. So clients end up saying, "Well, let’s just use both."

Now there are many companies in the market making a mistake: to piece together capabilities, they’ve used too many different infrastructure companies, resulting in increasingly complex systems. What we really want to do is provide them with the right solution from the start. And what they really need is almost always just one thing: to send and receive money in emerging markets. This isn’t about Bitcoin, crypto investments, or fancy blockchain narratives; it’s about payments.

Chris:
I’ve really seen too many large companies: publicly traded companies, multinationals, selling shoes, cookies, consumer goods. They’ve been sold "Bitcoin infrastructure." I always ask, "What do you actually want this for?" What they really need is:

• Paying suppliers

• Settling invoices

• Making cross-border fund transfers

• Managing cash flow for international business, not learning how to "use Bitcoin."

Drew:
So are these payment needs more about internal fund transfers or third-party payment settlements?

Chris:
Both. A lot of it is internal treasury fund movement, and there’s also a significant amount of third-party invoice settlements and cross-border payments.

Drew:
Chris, thank you very much for sharing the entire journey so comprehensively. One last slightly personal question: how do you see Yellow Card’s place in your life? Is this a venture you intend to invest in long-term and truly "plant your flag"?

Chris:
Considering where I go and what I eat, I think my life expectancy might be a bit shorter than average (laughs). So, brother, this has to work.

Drew:
I love that answer. Thank you so much for your sharing today.

Chris:
Thank you.

Drew:
Alright, thank you all for listening to this episode.