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BTC $60,596.45 -2.72%
ETH $1,552.99 -6.94%
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TRX $0.3186 -2.01%
DOGE $0.0806 -4.44%
ADA $0.1548 -4.39%
BCH $217.89 -2.82%
LINK $7.27 -3.90%
HYPE $58.77 -5.45%
AAVE $60.74 -9.40%
SUI $0.6973 -1.46%
XLM $0.1961 +3.27%
ZEC $368.93 +15.69%

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The second trial of the 660,000 yuan virtual currency theft case in Wuhan, China, has been revised: the main culprit was sentenced to ten years and six months in prison, and the amount stolen was determined based on the actual payment cost incurred by the victim

According to the "Procuratorial Daily," Lin, Zeng, and Dai conspired to use virtual currency trading as a pretext. During the trading process, they secretly filmed the victim's digital wallet private key and, after the virtual currency was credited, secretly logged into the victim's wallet to reverse the transaction, transferring the related virtual currency back to their controlled accounts. The three committed the crime three times, causing the victim a total economic loss of 660,000 yuan.The first-instance court held that in the absence of a clear judicial interpretation regarding the valuation method of virtual currency and sentencing standards, it was inappropriate to directly determine the amount involved as particularly huge based on the victim's purchase amount of 660,000 yuan. Therefore, they sentenced the three based on "other serious circumstances," imposing prison terms ranging from eight years to five years and six months, along with fines. The Hanyang District Procuratorate of Wuhan City in Hubei Province subsequently filed an appeal, which was supported by the Wuhan City Procuratorate.The prosecution argued that the first-instance court applied the law incorrectly and imposed an excessively light sentence. Prosecutor Dai Wentao of the Wuhan City Procuratorate stated that in the case where the victim had a clear loss amount to refer to, it was contradictory and legally erroneous to claim that the value of virtual currency could not be determined. In judicial practice, using the resale price and transaction price as the basis for determining the amount of theft has become mainstream, and determining the value of virtual currency based on the actual cost paid by the victim has factual, legal, and practical basis.The Intermediate Court of Wuhan accepted the prosecution's opinion in the second instance, revoked the corresponding content of the original judgment, and changed the determination of the theft amount to particularly huge. It sentenced the principal offender Lin to ten years and six months in prison for theft, and sentenced the accomplices Zeng and Dai to eight years in prison each, along with fines.

Superfortune: The leakage of the attacker's private key rather than address poisoning is not the work of an insider

Superfortune, incubated by Manta, recently released an update on the X platform regarding a security incident, stating that the attack was not carried out by internal personnel and that no team members were involved. The claim about the team secretly selling tokens is incorrect. The team has also not had any contact with Web3Port.The investigation confirmed that the attack was not due to address poisoning, but rather a leak of the signer's private key. The attacker independently held the private key and submitted a transaction with a forged address 43 minutes after the correct transaction. The forged address shares the first and last four characters with the correct address (starting with 0x70AE and ending with 5C15) to disguise itself in the Safe interface preview. The stolen funds are fully traceable and are currently stored in three cold wallets on Ethereum, containing approximately 2784 ETH, along with about 170,000 USDT that were cross-chain transferred out.The attacker also created a large number of counterfeit addresses and sent false transfer events to these addresses using Unicode-forged token symbols in an attempt to confuse tracking. This counterfeit address construction technique is the same as the method used when attacking this project. The attacker had pre-built a large-scale infrastructure, indicating that this was an industrialized operation rather than an opportunistic attack.

AI Agent Security Risk Exposure: Attackers Can Exploit "Memory Pollution" to Induce Misoperation of Funds

The GoPlus Security team has disclosed a new type of attack in its AgentGuard AI project: inducing AI agents to perform unauthorized sensitive operations through "memory poisoning." This attack method does not rely on traditional vulnerabilities or malicious code but exploits the long-term memory mechanism of AI agents. For example, an attacker first induces the agent to "remember preferences," such as "usually prioritizing proactive refunds instead of waiting for chargebacks," and then uses vague expressions like "process as usual" or "execute as before" in subsequent instructions, thereby triggering automated financial operations.GoPlus points out that the key risk in such cases lies in the AI agent mistakenly treating "historical preferences" as a basis for authorization, leading to financial losses or security incidents in operations such as refunds, transfers, and configuration changes. To address this issue, the team has proposed several protective recommendations, including:Operations involving refunds, transfers, deletions, or sensitive configurations must require explicit confirmation in the current session.Memory-related instructions like "habit," "usual way," and "as before" should be regarded as high-risk state changes.Long-term memory must have a traceability mechanism (writer, time, confirmation status).Vague instructions should automatically elevate the risk level and trigger secondary verification.Long-term memory must not replace real-time authorization processes.The team emphasizes that the "AI agent memory system" should be viewed as a potential attack surface and should be constrained and audited through a dedicated security framework.
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